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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
court held that the city had notice of the obstruction as it had been there
for some time, and that its failure to see that a safe passage was provided
for the pedestrians was the proximate cause of the injury.8
The court distinguished the previous cases on the ground that in these
cases the sidewalk already existed and was negligently maintained, while
in the present case no sidewalk was contemplated, and the alleged breach
of duty was therefore of a lesser degree. However, since the court as-
sumed negligence in the instant case, and in so doing admitted a breach
of duty, it seems somewhat illogical to distinguish the cases on the issue
of causation by reopening the issue of negligence.9
A better approach to the problem of causation would have been to con-
sider the purpose of the sidewalk, and, in the light of that purpose, the
nature of the hazards that might be regarded as falling within the natural
and probable consequences of the failure to maintain a sidewalk.10 Is
the sidewalk merely a convenience that is furnished by the city, or is it
a safety device to protect the pedestrian? The locale of the sidewalk may
be the determining factor, depending upon whether it is in a congested
traffic area or along a seldom traveled street. This will determine the
"risk of harm," "danger," or "hazard" which will come within the scope
of the duty to protect from injury.'
It is difficult to understand the grounds upon which the court held the
negligence of the city to be too remote from the injury to be, by any
possibility, the proximate cause of the injury. In any event there is ques-
tion raised in the case which reasonable men might answer differently. The
decision as to proximate cause should have been left to the jury.12
M. O'B. I.
WILLS-HOLOGRAPHS-WHAT CONSTITUTES "ALL IN TESTATOR'S HANDWRIT-
ING"-[Tennessee].-An instrument found among testator's valuable papers
was offered for probate. It was entirely in the testator's handwriting except
for the fact that it contained his wife's signature as well as his own. The
judge of the county court held that because of the wife's signature the will
was not entirely in the handwriting of the testator as required by the
8. Lindman v. Kansas City (1925) 308 Mo. 161, 271 S. W. 516; Shafir
v. Carroll (1925) 309 Mo. 458, 274 S. W. 755; Strother v. Seiben (1926) 220
Mo. App. 1027, 282 S. W. 502; Strother v. Carroll (Mo. 1926) 287 S. W.
310. These cases arose from the same incident mentioned in the text.
Stollhans v. City of St. Louis (1938) 343 Mo. 467, 121 S. W. (2d) 808.
(The court imputed liability to the city, though its negligence was incapable
of inflicting injury without the intervening negligent act.)
9. Smith v. Mabrey (Mo. 1941) 154 S. W. (2d) 770.
10. Green, Rationale of Proximate Cause (1927) 11-13, §3 "The law
never gives complete and absolute protection to any interest. The problem
therefore is, in any case, whether the particular hazard falls within the
radius of protection thrown about the interest."
11. Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co. (1928) 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E.
99, 59 A. L. R. 1253; Harper, The Law of Torts (1938) 79-80, §44.
12. Frese v. Wells (Mo. 1931) 40 S. W. (2d) 652; Prosser, Torts (1941)
873-374.
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Tennessee statute' and, therefore, declined to order the instrument pro-
bated. The circuit court and the court of appeals held that the instrument
was a valid holographic will. Held: Affirmed. The signature of the wife
could be disregarded as it was no part of the will of the husband, so
that the statute was complied with and the instrument could be probated
as a holographic will. Jones v. M'yers.2
Holographic wills are defined as wills written entirely in the testator's
hand, without subscribing witnesses.3 Holographic wills are recognized by
statute in nineteen states.4 The basis of the holographic will is that a
document entirely in the handwriting of the testator offers an adequate
guaranty of its genuineness. But the courts have split on the degree to
which they require the testament to be written in the hand of the testator.
The general rule is that the mere presence of printed matter or of writing
in another's hand on the paper on which the testament is written will not,
in itself, invalidate the will.5 Beyond this the authorities conflict. A noted
authority" has rationalized the cases by asserting that, in general, they
follow two distinct theories: (1) The intent theory and (2) The surplusage
theory. Under the intent theory foreign matter becomes a part of the will
whenever it appears that the testator intended to make it, or regard it as,
part of the will. Under the surplusage theory the courts will ignore any-
thing that may be left out without affecting the sense or completeness of
the document. Though in many cases the same result would be reached
under either theory, still, the surplusage theory naturally results in the
sustaining of wills which under the intent theory would fail. California
is the leading exponent of the intent theory and is followed only by Utah.8
1. Tenn. Code (Mitchie 1938) §8090: "But a paper writing, appearing
to be the will of a deceased person, written by him, having his name sub-
scribed to it, or inserted in some part of it, and found, after his death,
among his valuable papers, or lodged in the hands of another for safe-
keeping, shall be good and sufficient to give and convey lands, if the hand-
writing is generally known by his acquaintances, and it is proved by at
least three credible witnesses that they verily believe the writing, and every
part of it, to be in his hand."
2. (Tenn. 1941) 154 S. W. (2d) 245.
3. As defined by most of the statutes; see note 4, infra.
4. Bordwell, Statute Law of Wills (1928) 14 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 25.
5. In re Estate of De Caccia (1928) 205 Cal. 719, 273 Pac. 552, 61
A. L. R. 393; In re Atkinson's Estate (1930) 110 Cal. App. 499, 244 Pac.
425; In re Towle's Estate (1939) 14 Cal. (2d) 261, 92 P. (2d) 555; Mc-
Michael v. Bankston (1872) 24 La. Ann. 451; Baker v. Brown (1904) 83
Miss. 793, 36 So. 539, 1 Ann. Cases 371; Brown v. Beaver (1856) 48 N. C.
516; Atkinson, Wills (1937) 307, 308. 1 Page, Wills (3d ed. 1941) 698.
6. Mechem, The Integration of Holographic Wills (1933) 12 N. C. L. R.
213, 214-219.
7. In re Thorn's Estate (1920) 183 Cal. 512, 192 Pac. 19; In re Estate
of De Caccia (1928) 205 Cal. 719, 273 Pac. 552, 61 A. L. R. 393; In re
Oldham's Estate (1928) 203 Cal. 618, 265 Pac. 183; In re Whitney's Estate
(1930) 103 Cal. App. 577, 284 Pac. 1067; In re Durlewanger's Estate (Cal.
1940) 107 P. (2d) 477.
8. In re Wolcott's Estate (1919) 54 Utah 165, 180 Pac. 169, 4 A. L. R.
727; In re Yowell's Estate (1930) 75 Utah 312, 285 Pac. 285.
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Louisiana 9 heads the states which have adopted the surplusage theory, and
is followed by Virginia, o North Carolina," Arkansas, 2 Mississippi," s and
Montana."
It is held, without exception, that the signature of a witness or the
presence of a printed attestation clause will not invalidate an instrument
as a holographic will.15 Similarly, with but a single exception, the courts
have held that the filling out in the testator's handwriting of a printed
stationers' form violated the requirement that the instrument be entirely
written in the hand of the testator.16 Under either theory it has been held
that the printed name of the place where the instrument is written does
not invalidate it. 1" But in a California case,'8 under the intent theory,
where the testator incorporated the printed caption into his will, it was
held that the instrument was invalid. A court using the surplusage theory
would probably have decided the case differently. In jurisdictions which
require by statute that the will be dated, the date must be wholly in the
testator's hand. If a part of the date is printed and it is completed in the
testator's hand this is insufficient and the instrument is invalid.' 9 But
there is authority for the proposition that if the written portions of the
date are sufficient to satisfy the requirement of a date, then the printed
portion may be disregarded and the instrument probated as a holographic
will.20 If a date entirely written by the testator appears in some part of
the instrument an additional date partially printed and partially written
9. McMichael v. Bankston (1872) 24 La. Ann. 451; Jones v. Kyle (1929)
168 La. 728, 123 So. 306.
10. Gooch v. Gooch (1922) 134 Va. 21, 113 S. E. 873.
11. In re Lowrance's Will (1930) 199 N. C. 782, 155 S. E. 876.
12. Sneed v. Reynolds (1924) 166 Ark. 581, 266 S. W. 686.
13. Baker v. Brown (1904) 83 Miss. 793, 36 So. 539.
14. In re Noyes' Estate (1909) 40 Mont. 190, 105 Pac. 1017.
15. In re Soher's Estate (1889) 78 Cal. 477, 21 Pac. 8; In re Tanner's
Estate (Cal. 1939) 91 P. (2d) 170; Harl v. Vairins Ex'r. et. al. (1917)
175 Ky. 468, 194 S. W. 546; Jones v. Kyle (1929) 168 La. 728, 123 So. 306;
Brown v. Beaver (1856) 48 N. C. 516; Perkins v. Jones (1888) 84 Va. 358,
4 S. E. 833, 10 Am. St. Rep. 86.
16. Estate of Rand (1882) 61 Cal. 468, 44 Am. Rep. 555; In re Bower's
Estate (1938) 11 Cal. (2d) 180, 78 P. (2d) 1012; In re Wolcott's Estate
(1919) 54 Utah 165, 180 Pac. 169, 4 A. L. R. 727. Contra: Gooch v. Gooch
(1922) 184 Va. 21, 113 S. E. 873.
17. In re Oldham's Estate (1928) 203 Cal. 618, 265 Pac. 183; In re
Estate of De Caccia (1928) 205 Cal. 719, 273 Pac. 552, 61 A. L. R. 393;
In re Whitney's Estate (1930) 103 Cal. App. 577, 284 Pac. 1067; Succession
of Heinemann (1931) 172 La. 1057, 136 So. 51; In re Noyes' Estate (1909)
40 Mont. 190, 105 Pac. 1017, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1145; In re Lowrance's
Will (1930) 199 N. C. 782, 155 S. E. 876; In re Yowell's Estate (1930)
75 Utah 312, 285 Pac. 285.
18. In re Bernhard's Estate (1925) 197 Cal. 36, 239 Pac. 404.
19. Estate of Billings (1884) 64 Cal. 427, 1 Pac. 701; In re Francis's
Estate (1923) 191 Cal. 600, 217 Pac. 746; Succession of Robertson (1897)
49 La. Ann. 868, 21 So. 586, 62 Am. St. Rep. 672; In re Noyes' Estate
(1909) 40 Mont. 190, 105 Pac. 1017, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1145; In re Love's
Estate (Utah 1930) 285 Pac. 299.
20. In re Durlewanger's Estate (Cal. 1940) 107 P. (2d) 477.
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will be disregarded and the instrument held valid, even in jurisdictions
which have adopted the intent theory.21 In jurisdictions which do not re-
quire the testament to be dated, a printed portion of the date may be disre-
garded.22 Where the will was personally typewritten by the testator and
the signature was written in the testator's hand, the proposed holographic
will was held invalid.23
There are many interesting cases which cannot be placed in the above
categories. The presence of the words "to" and "acres" written in another's
hand in the body of the instrument was held not to invalidate the testa-
ment as a holographic will in McMichael v. Bankston.24 The words "My
Will" in a hand other than the testator's at the top of the page containing
the testament were held not to prevent the instrument from being probated
as a holographic will in Baker v. Brown.25 One of the most interesting
cases on this subject is that of In re Yowell. 26 In that case the proposed
holographic will was written on one of the testator's bill heads. Just below
the printed heading the testator pasted a printed sentimental stanza entitled
"Farewell." The court, which ordinarily follows the intent theory, held
this a good holographic will. The majority of the court held that there
was no intention to make the stanza a part of the testament. It reasoned
that because the testator wrote the word "All" at the beginning of the
stanza his intention was to direct the stanza to all persons and not only
to the beneficiary named in the will. The court paid homage to the intent
theory but succeeded in getting around the strictness of the test by saying
that there was no intent to make it a part of the instrument. It seems
clear that the testator intended to make the stanza a part of the will because
he cut it out and took great pains to paste it on the paper. This case
possibly marks the beginning of a tendency of the Utah court to drop the
intent theory and adopt the majority view. A similar tendency may also
be noted in California in the recent case of In re Durewanger's Estate.27
21. In re Whitney's Estate (1930) 103 Cal. App. 577, 284 Pac. 1067;
Jones v. Kyle (1929) 168 La. 728, 123 So. 306; In re Yowell's Estate (1930)
75 Utah 312, 285 Pac. 285. But see In re Francis's Estate (1923) 191 Cal.
600, 217 Pac. 746.
22. Sneed v. Reynolds (1924) 166 Ark. 581, 266 S. W. 686; In re
Lowrance's Will (1930) 199 N. C. 782, 155 S. E. 876.
23. In re Dreyfus's Estate (1917) 175 Cal. 417, 165 Pac. 941, L. R. A.
1917F, 391; Adam's Executors v. Beaumont (1928) 266 Ky. 311, 10 S. W.
(2d) 1106. But see Comment (1917) 5 Calif. L. Rev. 503 where a unique
stand is taken in favor of a typewritten holographic instrument.
24. (1872) 24 La. Ann. 451.
25. (1904) 83 Miss. 793, 36 So. 539, 1 Ann. Cas. 371.
26. (1930) 75 Utah 312, 285 Pac. 285.
27. (Cal. 1940) 107 P. (2d) 477, where the court held that the date,
May 3, 1938 (the first two numerals of year being printed) did not invali-
date the instrument. The California court has had a great deal of diffi-
culty in attempting to follow the intent theory. The Durlewanger case is
probably the most liberal decision ever handed down. The trouble was
started in In re Thorn's Estate (1920) 183 Cal. 512, 192 Pac. 19 where
the court insisted that there must be literal compliance with the statute
requiring the instrument to be "entirely written" by the hand of the
testator. This case controlled the decision in In re Francis's Estate (1923)
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol27/iss2/17
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These cases show two considerations fighting for supremacy. On the one
hand there is a natural desire to give effect to the testator's wishes by
disregarding seemingly trivial foreign matter. On the other hand, unfor-
tunately, in hard cases, it is sometimes necessary to maintain the basis of
the validity of holographic wills by rejecting them for seemingly technical
reasons.
In the instant case the court reached the desired and correct result. As
a precedent it had a North Carolina case directly in point, which held that
the signature of the testator's wife was mere surplusage and could be
disregarded.2 8 As the North Carolina and Tennessee statutes are identical
the North Carolina case was very persuasive authority. As a direct analogy
the court had the attestation cases, which unanimously hold that an other-
wise valid holographic will is not invalidated by the fact the testator had
it witnessed. Under both the intent and the surplusage theories the signa-
ture of the wife could not affect the validity of the instrument.
G. A. S.
191 Cal. 600, 217 Pac. 746 where the court held that the printed last two
numbers of the year invalidated the will even though another date entirely
in testator's hand appeared on the envelope also offered for probate. The
strict rule was also followed in In re Bernhard's Estate (1925) 197 Cal.
36, 239 Pac. 404. Finally the court relaxed its rule somewhat in the cases
of In re Oldham's Estate (1928) 203 Cal. 618, 265 Pac. 183 and In re
Estate of De Caccia (1928) 205 Cal. 719, 273 Pac. 552, 61 A. L. R. 393.
In In re Whitney's Estate (1930) 103 Cal. App. 577, 284 Pac. 1067 the
court intimated that the earlier decisions were distinguished, if not in effect,
overruled by the Oldham and DeCaccia cases. Then came the revision of the
California statute which in its altered form is found in Section 53 of the Cal-
ifornia Probate Code (1931). This revision was criticized by its draftsman
in Davis, Comments on the Probate Code of California (1931) 19 Calif. L.
Rev. 602, 609 because the statute was not sufficiently liberalized. In In re
Bower's Estate (1938) 11 Cal. (2d) 180, 78 P. (2d) 1012 the court reached
the desired result in holding that the use of a printed form invalidated the
will. But it then went further and attempted to rationalize the previous
California decision by distinguishing the Oldham and De Caccia cases from
the Thorn case on the ground that the two lines of authority apply to
different factual situations, based on whether the printed matter is included
or incorporated, directly or indirectly, in the will. The latest authority is
the Durlewanger case in which the court held that "substantial compliance"
with the statute was all that was necessary and that the new statute and
the more recent cases indicate a tendency toward liberality, bringing Cali-
fornia more in line with the decisions in other states. Although this case
is very encouraging, the court has not as yet clarified its position. Either
a new statute or a definite overruling of some of the older cases is prob-
ably necessary to make the situation clear.
28. In re Cole's Will (1916) 171 N. C. 74, 87 S. E. 962.
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